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Abstract
Reliability modelling of RAID storage systems with its various components such as
RAID controllers, enclosures, expanders, interconnects and disks is important from a
storage system designer’s point of view. A model that can express all the failure char-
acteristics of the whole RAID storage system can be used to evaluate design choices,
perform cost reliability trade-offs and conduct sensitivity analyses. However, including
such details makes the computational models of reliability quickly infeasible.
We present a CTMC reliability model for RAID storage systems that scales to much
larger systems than heretofore reported and we try to model all the components as ac-
curately as possible. We use several state-space reduction techniques at the user level,
such as aggregating all in-series components and hierarchical decomposition, to reduce
the size of our model. To automate computation of reliability, we use the PRISM model
checker as a CTMC solver where appropriate. We use both variations of PMC − nu-
merical as well as statistical model checking according to the size of our model. Our
modelling techniques using PRISM are more practical (in both time and effort) com-
pared to previously reported Monte-Carlo simulation techniques.
Our model for RAID storage systems (that includes, for example, disks, expanders,
enclosures) uses Weibull distributions for disks and, where appropriate, correlated fail-
ure modes for disks, while we use exponential distributions with independent failure
modes for all other components. To use the CTMC solver, we approximate the Weibull
distribution for a disk using sum of exponentials and we confirm that this model gives
results that are in reasonably good agreement with those from the sequential Monte
Carlo simulation methods for RAID disk subsystems reported in literature earlier. Us-
ing a combination of scalable techniques, we are able to model and compute reliability
for fairly large configurations with upto 600 disks using this model.
1 Introduction
Despite major efforts, both in industry and in academia, achieving high reliability re-
mains a major challenge in large-scale IT systems. A particularly big concern is the
reliability of storage systems because failure can not only cause temporary data un-
availability but also to permanent data loss in the worst case.
The reliability of RAID storage systems used in data centres or in critical server ap-
plications needs to be high. These systems consist of many components such as RAID
controllers, enclosures, expanders, interconnects and, of course, disks. Failures in any
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of these components can lead to downtime or data loss, or both. Hence, redundancy is
provided through, for example, dual controllers and dual expanders for high availabil-
ity. A multiplicative set of paths thus needs to be considered for modelling reliability,
but decomposition techniques that have been reported recently[13] cannot handle the
explosive growth in the paths due to their reliance on locality and fixpoint iterations
across local modules.
While several studies have been conducted on understanding and modelling “disk”
failures [7,?], there seems to be little work done on scalable analysis of the reliability
of a “whole” RAID storage system with its various components. Jiang et al. [1] pre-
sented an empirical analysis of NetApp AutoSupport logs collected from about 39,000
storage systems commercially deployed at various customer sites. An important finding
of the study is that component failures other than disks (such as those of controllers,
enclosures, SAS cables) contribute most (27-68%) to the failure of storage subsystems.
Another recent study [2] by Ford et al. characterizes the end to end data availability
properties of cloud storage systems at the distributed file system level based on an ex-
tensive one year study of Google’s main storage infrastructure. A key point is the im-
portance of modelling correlated failures when predicting availability, and show their
impact under a variety of replication schemes and placement policies.
To design and build a reliable RAID storage system, it is important to have a model
of the storage system that expresses all the storage failure characteristics of all of its
components using which we can do several “what-if” analyses for the storage system.
Simulation (for example, written in plain C code) is a widely used and powerful tech-
nique for evaluating such systems. Simulation is the most flexible since it allows us
to use arbitrary distributions (such as Weibull common in reliability studies) and even
traces. However, writing simulation code for such non-trivial systems is error-prone or
the results cannot be validated easily.
To compute the reliability of a RAID storage system, we need to model all the
RAID components while keeping scalability in mind, but previous work, to the best of
our knowledge, has not considered such models. In this work, we model all the com-
ponents of a RAID storage system (controllers, enclosures, expanders, interconnects
and disks) with a failure rate and repair rate, and use scalable techniques for computing
reliability. In addition, we use a CTMC solver from the PRISM verification tool[10]
that is well known for its computational efficiency and ability to minimize state spaces
(it can therefore handle in excess of 100’s of millions of states), provide a powerful
language that can easily express the desired reliability queries and also provides results
using simulation that samples paths on the same reliability model when the state space
becomes too large.
We assume exponential failure distribution for all the components in the system
except disks. For disks, we initially assume a simple 3-state model [5] and later we
use a Weibull model [9]. We approximate Weibull model using a sum of exponentials
and show that this model gives almost the same results as the sequential Monte-Carlo
simulation methods for disk subsystems reported earlier [9].
However, the results of using this detailed Weibull model do not agree well with
the field data for the RAID configurations we use for validation. Hence we infer cor-
related failures in such configurations and therefore revise our models by estimating
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and including correlated failures. Since such models are computationally difficult, we
use a variety of techniques for scalability (such as hierarchical decomposition); we are
then able to model large RAID configurations with upto 600 disks. The primary goal
in this paper is the development of the methodology for computing the reliability of
reasonable size storage systems while being as close as possible to real storage systems
and validated against whatever field data is available. As we do not have access to some
parameters that are critical (for eg, for correlated disk failures), we hope that such data
will be increasingly be collected and made available to researchers in the future.
Our models can be used to perform sensitivity analysis and make cost-reliability
tradeoffs. It can also help in throwing some light on the suitability of Markov models
for computing storage reliability. Greenan [12] has suggested that only simulation can
be used to model rebuild progress but not Markov models due to their memorylessness.
However, we show that with the right models, it is possible to simulate memory even
with Markov models and we do get similar results.
The outline of the paper is as follows: Section 2 briefly describes the components
present in storage systems and presents some configurations. Section 3 lists definitions,
model input parameters and modelling assumptions. Section 4 shows the modelling of
RAID storage systems using a simple disk model. Section 5 shows detailed modelling
of RAID disk subsystems assuming Weibull model and correlated failure. This section
also discusses validation of our model against field data. Section 6 presents conclusions.
2 Storage System Architecture
2.1 Main Components in RAID Storage Systems
RAID Controllers: These are usually a pair of controllers, one acting as the primary
and the other acting as the backup. For load balancing, one controller is the primary for
half the disks in the system that also acts as the secondary for the rest of the disks; it is
vice versa for the other controller.
Enclosures: All the disks reside in a component called “external storage enclosure”
for expandability and portability. In each enclosure, there are several components such
as redundant power supply/cooling fans and midplane for all the disks. An enclosure
fails if both the power supplies fail or both the cooling fans fail, or the midplane fails.
As enclosure components are shared by all the disks inside, an enclosure’s reliability
depends on the number of disks inside.
Expanders: This is a fan-out switch used in large storage systems to connect mul-
tiple initiators and targets for scalability and fault-tolerant path redundancy.
Interconnects are usually SAS (Serially Attached Storage) cables for connecting
system components.
Disks in the system are SAS or SATA disks. SAS controllers support both SAS and
SATA disks.
2.2 Some Storage System Configurations
Figs. 1(a) and 1(b) show a 4 disk RAID5 group in one enclosure and across 2 enclosures
respectively. There are multiple types of “redundancy” present:
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1. redundant controllers, interconnects, expanders
2. redundant disks (RAID)
3. redundant enclosures (with “spanned” RAID groups across)
(a) 1 enclosure (b) 2 enclosure
Fig. 1. 4 disk RAID5 in 1 and 2 enclosures
While the first two redundancy mechanisms clearly increase the reliability of the sys-
tem, analysis is needed to know when spanning is beneficial.
3 Definitions and Assumptions
Definition 1 [RAID5 Reliability] A RAID5 group experiences “data inaccessibility or
data loss” (DIL) if
1. data in any of two disks in the RAID5 group are inaccessible. The data in a disk is
said to be inaccessible if some component in its access path fails or the disk itself
fails.
2. Or, a data of a disk is inaccessible and an unrecoverable error occurs during re-
build of the data.
We can extend the above definition to RAID6 and other RAID systems by changing the
number of inaccessible data disks in the first part of the definition.
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3.1 Newer Reliability Measures
Definition 2 [MTTDIL] Mean Time before “any” of the RAID groups experiences
“data inaccessibility or data loss” (DIL). This denotes the average time before which
at least one user using the system experiences data unavailability.
Note that MTTDIL has lower value than MTTF as inaccessibility of data is also
taken into account, not just data loss. It is therefore a composite measure of availability
and reliability.
Given the computational flexibility with the use of PRISM toolset [10], it is possible
to compute specific reliability measures as needed by the system at hand. Due to lack
of space we describe them in Appendix A
We have chosen the “mean” as our reliability measure even though it may not be a
good reliability metric [3] as the field data available with us provide only the “mean”
values.
3.2 Modelling assumptions
Due to the lack of relevant disk failure parameters in the field data (as needed in detailed
disk models such as 5.1), we build our models incrementally and, at each stage, check
with field data available for the storage system as a whole.
1. Initially, we assume uncorrelated failures across components. Later, we consider
correlated failures for disks in our model and show that the model results match the
field data available to us.
2. For a disk, we assume at the start a simple 3-state Markov model (with burn-in
rate, pre-burn-in failure rate, post burn-in failure rate [5]) but later consider Weibull
models. We assume constant failure rate for all other components as we have access
only to MTTF values.
3. We also assume constant repair rate for all the components but this is not necessary.
3.3 Model input parameters
Table 1 shows MTTF values of the components obtained from a few storage vendors1.
Meanwhile, disk MTTF has been taken from previous literature [7,4]. We have used
Mean Time to Repair (MTTR) of a non-critical component as 30 min based on some
inputs from industry.
For all the computational results reported in this paper, we have used a 2.8GHz 8GB
RAM machine with 16GB swap space.
4 Modelling RAID5 systems with a simple disk model
In the beginning, we give a brief introduction to other possible modelling aprroaches
and compare them with our approach using PRISM. In the later subsections we describe
our models using PRISM.
1 Some of the field data have been generously given to us by a storage vendor but requesting no
attribution.
2 The enclosure type we consider here can contain atmost 24 disks.
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Components MTTF value
Disk 33 yr
Controller 604440 hr
Expander 2560000 hr
Enclosure2 28400 hr if 6 50% full, else 11100 hr
Interconnect 200000 hr
Table 1. MTTF of components
Fig. 2. Model of a n disk RAID5 in an enclosure assuming disk correlated failure; State 0: work-
ing, 1: one disk fails, 2: data loss, h: probability of unrecoverable error during rebuild, λ: disk
failure rate, µ: rebuild rate
4.1 PRISM: Comparison with other approaches
Continuous Time Markov Chains (CTMC) have been used widely to build reliability
models of systems. For example, a simple Markov reliability model of RAID5 is given
by Rao et al. [7] (see Fig.2 with p=0). For more complex configurations or for modelling
other components such as enclosures, tool-enabled computational models are critical.
Another approach for evaluating such complex systems is Monte-Carlo simulation
techniques where one has to manually find all the system failure cases by keeping a
timeline for each of the components. However, writing simulation code for such non-
trivial systems is error-prone or the results cannot be validated easily.
Here, we use a model checking tool, PRISM (Probabilistic Symbolic Model Checker)
[10], to build and analyze the CTMC models. PRISM has a modular process algebra
based language with a probability and reward operator, and it supports quantitative
model checking. This is suitable for modelling the reliability of systems as the fail-
ure mode of each component can be described in a module separately. Given a PRISM
program, PRISM uses matrix computations for exact model checking (by numerical so-
lution technique) of logical formulae (in continuous stochastic logic, CSL), as well as
a sampling based simulation approach that is suitable when the state size is very large.
We use both approaches according to the size of the model. All our models are reliabil-
ity models and hence there are no transitions in our models out of the “data inaccessible
or loss” state of a specific instance of a RAID system when we calculate MTTDIL.
Our modelling environment in PRISM is much more feasible for modelling large
complex storage systems compared to the Monte-Carlo simulation techniques as, in
case of PRISM, the tool itself, in effect, does the work of finding all the system failure
cases for us, by building a CTMC model of the whole system, from model description
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written in the PRISM modelling language. Moreover, in case of rare-event failures sim-
ulation may take a long time compared to the PRISM model checking (we show such
an example in Section 5.1).
In the following section, we describe several modelling and state-space reductions
techniques for our systems. Section 4.2 presents results of modelling of some small sys-
tems mainly using PRISM model checker. Section 4.3 uses PRISM discrete-event sim-
ulator to calculate reliability measures for larger systems. Section 4.4 presents the hi-
erarchical decomposition technique to model even larger systems. Section 4.5 presents
results of modelling some known field configurations (such as multiple controller pair
configurations) along with how they agree with field data.
4.2 PRISM model of small systems
In RAID systems, there are some components connected in series (such as the con-
troller, interconnect and expander in Fig.1(a)). To reduce the state space, we can com-
pose them: if there is a set of components com1, com2, ...., comk in series and if each
component has the same repair rate, then we can replace the set by an equivalent com-
ponent com such that failure rate of com =
∑k
i=1 f(i), where f(i) is failure rate of
the i-th component in series and repair rate of com is µ where µ is repair rate of each
component (Fig.3).
Fig. 3. Composing in-series components: com1 and com2 are in series and can be replaced by
series equivalent com as the Markov model at right is equivalent to the model at left. x/x′/x′′
stands for the transitions corresponding to other components i.e. those that are not connected in
series with com1 and com2. State 1’ is the merged equivalent of states 1 and 2. Pi(t) is the
transient probability of reaching state i
We replace all the final states (corresponding to different types of failures such as
those of enclosure, expander or disk) in our model by a single “fail state”. Using these
two optimizations, we are able to reduce the model size and execution time significantly
(although, execution time still mainly depends on model input parameters).
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Enclosure MTTF indep. of no. of disks Enclosure MTTF ∝ no. of disks
m Distribution of disks States t=12 Time(hr) Model size(GB) t=2 t=3 t=4
1 − 14827521 27697 0.2 0.3 10975 10975 10975
2
(7+1) 20803073 27676 0.5 0.4 10971 10971 10971
(6+2) 36399361 14004 1 0.7 7911 7911 7911
(5+3) 35961985 14004 1.1 0.8 5513 7911 7911
(4+4) 34561793 14004 0.6 0.8 5513 5513 14004
3
(6+1+1) 36115713 27654 1.2 0.7 10967 10967 10967
(5+2+1) 77596289 13998 4.3 2.1 7909 7909 7909
(4+3+1) 62729729 13998 3 1.8 5512 7909 13998
(3+3+2) 114833281 9372 4.6 7.5 3682 9372 9372
(4+2+2) 96482561 9372 3.6 2.9 6185 6185 9372
4
(5+1+1+1) 28689665 27630 0.5 0.5 10962 10962 10962
(4+2+1+1) 53671681 13992 1.4 1 7907 7907 13992
(3+1+2+2) 109296129 9369 4.6 2.1 6183 9369 9369
(2+2+2+2) 145866497 7043 1.8 8.1 7043 7043 7043
5
(4+1+1+1+1) 42528513 27606 1.8 0.8 10958 10958 27606
(3+1+2+1+1) 66852353 13986 4 1.5 7904 13986 13986
(2+2+2+1+1) 100492801 9366 3.6 1.9 9366 9366 9366
6 (3+1+1+1+1+1) 44301697 27581 0.9 0.7 10954 27581 27581(2+2+1+1+1+1) 67861761 13979 1 1.0 13979 13979 13979
7 (2+1+1+1+1+1+1) 45208577 27360 1 0.6 27360 27360 27360
8 (1+1+1+1+1+1+1+1) 8649402441 OOM − − − − −
Table 2. MTTDIL (hr) of a 8 disk RAID5; m: number of enclosures; t is the threshold number
of disks in an enclosure (max 24 disks) after which its MTTF decreases; OOM: Out of Memory
Error; indep.: independent; ∝: dependent. Note that MTTDIL of 7000 hours is not indicative of
unacceptable data loss as it incorporates non-availability due to interconnect failure.
Table 2 shows MTTDIL of a 8 disk RAID5 with m enclosures (m 6 8) calculated
in PRISM. The second column denotes the distribution of disks across enclosures. For
m enclosures, (i1 + i2 + ...... + im) denotes a configuration with m enclosures where
enclosure j contains ij number of disks of the RAID group. Table 2 also shows the
MTTDIL values assuming variable failure rate for an enclosure i.e.
enclosure MTTF = 28400 hr if no. of disks in it 6 t
= 11100 hr otherwise
We have generalized the value of t from 2 to 4 (while for field data it is 50% occu-
pancy) to understand its impact. Given m enclosures, each with some capacity c, it is
not possible to say what the optimal configuration is without detailed modelling.
The important findings from the analysis of PRISM models are:
1. A 10% increase of enclosure MTTF causes MTTDIL to increase by 9.9%. Hence,
the enclosure is the main determining component in the reliability of a RAID group.
2. MTTDIL depends on the number of enclosures present in the system and the dis-
tribution of disks of a RAID group across enclosures. For example, consider three
cases (Table 2) of distribution of disks in 2 enclosures (4+4), 3 enclosures (6+1+1)
and 4 enclosures (3+1+2+2). In the first case, if “any” of the enclosures fail “data
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inaccessibility” occurs while in the second case only failure of enclosure 1 causes
“data inaccessibility”. Hence, spanning increases reliability here. In the third case,
out of 4 enclosures, failure of 3 enclosures causes “data inaccessibility”. Hence,
spanning decreases reliability compared to case 1.
Based on the results of Table 2 we have designed a algorithm for spanning a RAID
group across enclosures which is described in detail in Appendix B.
Configs. MP SP Gain Extra Cost
(1, 2, R1) 28400 23665 1.2 (1, 1, 3)
(2, 2, R1) 6.68E8 3.39E8 1.97 (0, 2, 4)
(2, 2, R1) 6.68E8 603561 1106 (1, 2, 4)
(1, 4, R5) 28245 23552 1.2 (1, 1, 5)
(2, 4, R5) 14157 11801 1.2 (0, 2, 6)
(2, 4, R5) 14157 12036 1.18 (1, 2, 6)
(4, 4, R5) 4629364 281707 16 (0, 4, 8)
(4, 4, R5) 4629364 528003 8.7 (1, 4, 8)
Table 3. Cost-reliability trade-offs: Configs. (a, b, c): a: no. of enclosures, b: no. of disks, c:
RAID group type (R1: RAID1, R5: RAID5); MP: multi-pathing and SP: single-pathing; Gain:
reliability gain using multi-pathing; Extra cost (a, b, c) due to multi-pathing: a: no. of controllers,
b: no. of expanders, c: no. of SAS cables.
Jiang et al. [1] showed that multi-pathing increases storage reliability. Table 3 shows
some configurations both with multi-pathing and single-pathing, and the corresponding
MTTDIL values. In some cases, multi-pathing increases reliability by a factor of more
than 1000 whereas in some other cases it is much lower. Based on such calculations,
cost-reliability trade-offs can be attempted. The redundancy of a component is benefi-
cial only if a single failure of some other component does not cause “data inaccessibil-
ity” of a whole RAID group.
4.3 Discrete Event Simulation
Table 2 shows (for m=8) that it is not possible to model large systems consisting of
multiple RAID groups using PRISM model checker (due to state space explosion).
To calculate the reliability measures for larger systems we use PRISM discrete-event
simulator. This simulator generates a large number of random paths using the PRISM
language model description (without explicitly constructing the corresponding Markov
Model), evaluates the result of the given properties on each run, and uses this infor-
mation to generate an approximately correct result. Currently, PRISM simulator has
support only for exponential distribution. We use a confidence parameter of 0.01 and
“maximum path length” of 1E9 to calculate our reliability measures. PRISM imposes a
maximum path length to avoid the need to generate excessively long or infinite paths.
Fig.4 shows two configurations with multiple RAID groups. Fig.4(a) shows a 4
enclosure 24 disk system with 4 RAID5 groups without redundant paths for disks in
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(a) single-pathing in encl. 3/4 (b) multi-pathing
Fig. 4. 4 enclosures 24 disks as 4 RAID5 groups
enclosures 3 and 4 whereas in Fig.4(b) redundant paths are present for disks in enclo-
sures 3 and 4. Enclosures 3 and 4 are daisy-chained to enclosures 1 and 2 respectively
as the controller may not have enough ports to connect all the enclosures present in the
system directly. Table 4 gives the MTTDIL for these systems.
It is not possible to simulate larger systems with the required confidence because
the time for simulation increases rapidly and we need to decompose our models.
Configs. Reliability Measures By Simulation(hr)3 Time By Decomp.(hr) Err(%) States Time
single-pathing MTTDIL 5940 2.7 hr 5972 0.54 13 137s
multi-pathing MTTDIL 6968 3.6 hr 7015 0.7 148 137s
Table 4. Results with Simulation and Hierarchical Decomposition for the systems of Fig 4); Err:
% diff betw the two results, SMTTDIL: System MTTDIL
4.4 Hierarchical decomposition
From Figs.4(a) and 4(b) we note that the disks and the interconnects that connect the
disks of a RAID group to the expanders contribute to the reliability of that particular
RAID group. Hence, we can model them separately, i.e. we can divide the whole system
into subsystems that can be modelled independently and the submodel results can be
used in the higher level model. Each subsystem consists of the disks and the intercon-
nects from expanders to the disks. The subsystems are logically separable rather than
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physically as each of them is connected to the components shared by all of them (such
as a controller). This technique is called “hierarchical decomposition” which is a very
general technique to model large systems. Trivedi et al. [6] has applied this technique to
model and analyze the reliability of large systems such as telecommunication systems
and cloud computing systems. The step of dividing the system into subsystems is called
the “decomposition phase” and the step of using the sub-model results into the final
model is called the “aggregation phase”.
However, our storage systems are designed with high availability in mind with a
multiplicative set of paths and are somewhat different from the systems considered by
Trivedi[13] where strong modularity is present with only a few inter-module paths.
Each of the modules in the latter can be modelled separately and the outputs of the
sub-models can be fixpoint-iterated to get the final result whereas the combinatorial
structure of our systems (where each component designed with redundancy in mind
has to be connected to all other adjacent non-similar components for high availability)
makes it difficult to directly use Trivedi’s technique. Using tool support (such as with
PRISM system) is critical to sample the many failure paths to estimate the reliability of
such HA systems with good accuracy.
To model a system with multiple RAID groups, we model each of the RAID groups
(where a RAID group comprises the disks in it and the interconnects that connect to
the disks from expanders) separately and feed the results to the model at a higher level.
Hence, we have two levels: RAID group level and system level. If the RAID group
itself is too large to model in PRISM, we use hierarchical decomposition to model the
RAID group itself, i.e. we model each disk (where a disk also includes its interconnects)
separately and feed the results to the model at the RAID group level. Hence, in this case,
we have three levels: the disk level, the RAID group level and the system level.
Fig. 5. Decomposition phase for the systems of Fig.4
Note that we are using an approximation technique: when we reduce an n-state, m-
transition model (representing a subsystem) to a 2-state, 1-transition model (represent-
ing the equivalent component), some errors are introduced. For example, the holding
time in the up/down state in the 2-state, 1-transition model is exponentially distributed,
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while in the original n-state m-transition model, that may not be true. The necessary
conditions for this technique to be exact are:
1. The computed measures are steady-state.
2. The subsystems transformed into “equivalent” model are stochastically indepen-
dent from other subsystems. If not, the technique can still be used, provided that
the dependence can be expressed at some higher level in the hierarchy.
As our reliability measure is “mean” (as opposed to steady state probability mea-
sures calculated by Trivedi et al. for his systems), when we use this technique we obtain
approximate results. Moreover, when we separately model a subsystem, ignoring the
complete system, we lose some failure events. If we do a proper decomposition, these
are rare and the accuracy is not affected. Our results show that the accuracy depends on
how close the subsystems (independently considered) approach an exponential failure
distribution (constant failure rate).
(a) single-pathing (b) multi-pathing
Fig. 6. Aggregation phase for the systems of Fig.4
Fig.4(a) shows 4 subsystems (independently considered) in the system: Sub1, Sub2,
Sub3, Sub4. Hence, we have two level hierarchy for the systems of Fig.4. In level
0 (lower level), we model the subsystems (independently considered) and in level 1
(higher level) we model the shared components. Figs.5 and 6 show the decomposition
phase and the aggregation phase respectively. We calculate the reliability measures us-
ing hierarchical decomposition and the results we obtain is consistent with simulation
results (Table 10). We use a shell script to calculate reliability measures for a system
3 simulation widths are almost 1% of the point estimator
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using hierarchical decomposition. In the script, lower level model results are calculated
first using PRISM and then passed as a input parameter to the next higher level model
and so on.
Table 4 shows the results of hierarchical decomposition.
Our results show that the use of hierarchical decomposition is indicated in the fol-
lowing three scenarios:
1. The system is too large to simulate and there is no other option except using hier-
archical decomposition.
2. When the system can be simulated but each subsystem considered independently
has a constant failure rate (which can be checked using goodness-of-fit tests such
as Kolmogorov-Smirnov test).
3. When each subsystem has a small contribution to the reliability of the overall sys-
tem (which can be checked by sensitivity analysis).
4.5 Modelling of some known field configurations
Tables 5 and 9 shows the MTTF of the components used in some large storage con-
figurations and field MTTDIL value4 respectively. In these systems, a RAID5 group
consists of 6 disks. For the systems with multiple controller pairs, no RAID group is
implemented across controller pairs. We model these systems and check whether the
model results match the field data.
Components MTTF (in hr)
Controller 35000
Type1 enclosure(t1) 60000 if 6 half-full; else 23000
Type2 enclosure(t2) 50000 when full
Table 5. MTTF of the components for large storage configs.
Modelling single controller-pair systems
1. We simulate the 24 disk system of Table 9 in PRISM simulator with 99% C.I. and
106 samples. The time for simulation is 5 hr with MTTDIL = 45859 hr. The sub-
system consisting of 24 disks and 48 interconnects contributes very little to the
MTTDIL of the whole system; this has been verified using sensitivity analysis. Us-
ing hierarchical decomposition, we get MTTDIL as 46098 hr with time for model
checking being only 4 min.
2. We use hierarchical decomposition to model the 60 disk system of Table 9 because
it is too large to simulate in PRISM. MTTDIL is 20960 hr with time taken for model
checking also being 4 min.
4 The details about the field data are not known (for example, how many samples are used to get
the mean values of Table 9 for these configurations).
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Modelling multiple controller pair systems Fig.7 shows a configuration with mul-
tiple controller pairs. We can think of these systems consisting of subsystems each
corresponding to one controller pair and not connected to each other. Hence, they are
“totally independent” or “physically independent” (they do not share any common com-
ponents). Here these subsystems are also symmetric. There are various approaches to
model such systems:
Fig. 7. 20 controller pair 20 enclosure 480 disk systems
Hierarchical Decomposition: We model/simulate any one “totally independent
subsystem” and do a hypothesis test to check whether a subsystem has a constant failure
rate or not. If yes, then MTTDIL of the whole system is = MTTDIL of a subsystem /
number of “totally independent” subsystems.
If we can model a “totally independent subsystem” using PRISM model checker
or discrete-event simulator, we call this “partial hierarchical decomposition” (P). If a
“totally independent subsystem” is too large to model using PRISM simulator we use
hierarchical decomposition to model the subsystem itself; we call it “total hierarchical
decomposition” (T). We have used both these techniques but due to lack of space we do
not present results here.
Simulation of the whole system: When each of the independent subsystems has a
non-constant failure rate, then we can simulate the whole system to get a confidence in-
terval for our reliability measure. Let Y be the random variable to denote the time to DIL
(data inaccessible or data loss) of the whole system and X1, X2, . . . , Xn be the time to
DIL of each of the n independent subsystems. Then Y = min(X1, X2, . . . , Xn). To
calculate E[Y ] we take N observations. In the i-th observation we simulate each of
the subsystems and get the samples xi1, xi2, . . . , xin (xij is the time to DIL of the j-th
subsystem in i-th observation) and calculate yi = min(xi1, xi2, . . . , xin). Estimated
E[Y ] =
∑N
i=1 yi/N
Discretization process: The ideal approach to model such large systems is to cal-
culate the probability of DIL for a “totally independent subsystem” and calculate the
probability of data inaccessibility or loss for the whole system using the formula
W (t) = 1− (1 − F (t))n. (1)
where W (t) is the probability of DIL of the whole system, F (t) is the probability of
DIL of a subsystem and n is the number of independent subsystems present in the
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system. Now,
E[X ] =
∫ ∞
0
(1−W (t))dt =
∫ ∞
0
(1− F (t))ndt. (2)
Let g(t) = (1 − F (t))n. We calculate MTTDIL from this probability values using
sampling based techniques as follows: First, we find a maximum range of the random
variable X which represents time to DIL. For that we find the value max, such that
g(max) < δ where δ is some error bound, say, 1E-4. Then we divide the range of the
random variable (0 to max) into steps each of size h.
U = hg(0) + hg(h) + · · ·+ hg((k − 1)h) (3)
L = hg(h) + hg(2h) + · · ·+ hg(kh) (4)
where U and L stands for Upper and Lower Riemann sum respectively. k is the number
of steps each of size h, so kh = max. Clearly,
L < E[X ] < U (5)
To get a good bound on E[X ], our aim is to reduce the difference between U and L.
Suppose, we want a difference of ǫ i.e. U -L = ǫ. Then
U − L = h[g(0)− g(kh)] = h[1− g(kh)] ≈ h (6)
assuming g(kh) = g(max) ≈ 0. Hence, we choose a step size (h) of ǫ. The process is
shown in Fig.8.
(a) Upper Sum (b) Lower Sum
Fig. 8. Discretization approach
For both simulation and discretization approach, we use a shell script to calculate
the MTTDIL values. For simulation, the script generates samples (using PRISM sim-
ulator) for time to DIL for each “totally independent subsystem” and takes minimum
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of them, repeats the whole process for the specified number of observations and cal-
culates mean and variance of those minimum values from each observation. In case of
discretization approach, the script generates probabilities of DIL for a “totally indepen-
dent subsystem” at time t where t ranges from 0 to max with a step size of h using
PRISM simulator. From these probabilities, we calculate MTTDIL with the sampling
technique described above using a C program invoked from the script.
Table 6 under the column labeled “without correlated failure” shows the results
after applying these approaches to the systems of Fig.7. We assume ǫ = 175 hr for the
discretization approach.
Comparison between the techniques: The results using hierarchical decomposition are
slightly off from the results using other two approaches. The reason is the constant fail-
ure rate assumption of each individual subsystem. We are able to reject the hypothesis
in each of the above cases that each individual subsystem has a constant failure rate
using Kolmogorov-Smirnov test with 5% level of significance. If each of the individual
subsystem has a failure distribution which is far from exponential then it is best to use
the simulation approach. The method of calculating mean using discretization approach
has an advantage in that the error is bounded (with probability 1) but it has the following
disadvantages:
1. Each individual subsystem is modelled using PRISM simulator. Hence, the F (t)
result value has some error. When we calculate W (t) = 1− (1−F (t))n, the error
can increase.
2. To get a small difference between U and L, we need a small value for step size h
i.e. large number of steps. Hence, this procedure can take a long time for small h.
Comparison of model results with field data: Our computed results, however, deviate
significantly from the field data. The possible reasons are:
1. Since we do not have field data for disk failure, we may have assumed a simple
model for disk failure instead of, for example, Weibull. Disk failure model may
affect the result because the number of disks present in the system is much higher
than other components.
2. Correlated/burst failure of disks: Many disks in an enclosure may fail within a
short span due to high temperature, power supply spikes, vibration etc. thus causing
double disk failures almost simultaneously.
To identify the main factors, we consider other disk failure models (such as Weibull
disk model or correlated disk failure model) to check whether these models agree with
field data.
5 Detailed model of disk subsystems
5.1 Disk reliability model with Weibull distribution
We use the detailed disk reliability model of Elerath et al. [9]. The model assumptions
are as follows: Time to operational failure (TTOp) with a 2-parameter Weibull (shape
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without correlated failure with correlated failure
480 disk 600 disk 480 disk 600 disk
Methods MTTDIL (hr) T MTTDIL (hr) T MTTDIL (hr) T MTTDIL (hr) T
M1 2293 5h 2590 1.11h 1750 25h 1253 3h
M2 2304 4m 2616 4m 1800 10m 1290 10m
M3 2160±109 29h 2337±114 36h 1600±84 38h 1128± 48 29h
M4 L=2057, U=2232 48h L=2308, U=2483 48h L=1510, U=1685 36h L=1062, U=1237 31h
Table 6. Model results for multiple controller pair configs.: M1: Hierarch. Decomp. (P), M2:
Hierarch. Decomp. (T), M3: Simulation, M4: Discretization; T: Time. The field data for 480 disk
configs. is 1700 hr and for 600 disk configs. is 1200 hr.
= 1.12, scale = 461386 hrs); Time to restore (TTR) with a 3-parameter Weibull (shape
= 2, scale = 12 hours and offset 6 hours); Time to scrub (TTScr) with a 3-parameter
Weibull (shape = 3, scale = 168 hours and offset 6 hours); Time to latent defect (TTLd)
with shape = 1 (an exponential distribution) and scale = 9259 hours
Elerath et al. presented a sequential Monte Carlo simulation method using these
models to calculate DDF(t) where DDF(t) stands for number of double disk failures in
time t. Elerath also created a simple DDF(t) equation [11] for N+1 RAID systems to
calculate expected number of double disk failures. A DDF occurs when any two disks of
a RAID5 group experience operational failure or one disk has a latent defect followed
by operational failure from another disk. As PRISM does not support anything other
than exponential distributions, we approximate Weibull distributions using phase type
distributions (sum of exponentials). All of the above Weibull failure/repair models have
increasing failure rates. We use the same 3 state model of [5] for each of the Weibull
models and find the parameters of the models using the standard technique of moment
matching. The pdf (probability density function) of the fail state in the 3-state model is:
1
σ + α− β
[βσe−βt + (α− β)(σ + α)e−(σ+α)t]
The first three moments of this distribution are:
µ1 =
σ
β +
α−β
α+σ
α− β + σ
; µ2 =
β2 + σ(2α+ σ)
β2(α+ σ)2
; µ3 =
2
(
1 + −α
3+β3
(α+σ)3
)
β3
. (7)
Solving these three equations, we obtain σ, α and β:
σ =
4µ3
1
−6µ1µ2+µ3±
√
x
y ; α = −
2(µ31−3µ1µ2+µ3)
y ; β =
2µ3
1
−µ3∓
√
x
y where
x =−2µ6
1
+6µ4
1
µ2−18µ21µ22+18µ32+8µ31µ3−12µ1µ2µ3+µ23; y=µ41+3µ22−2µ1µ3
We equate them with the first three moments of Weibull for each of the three cases:
TTOp, TTScr, TTR. For TTOp, the solutions turn out to be α = 1.72E − 6 and either
σ = 2.49E − 6, β = 2.88E − 6 or, equivalently σ = 1.16E − 6, β = 4.21E − 6
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Comparison of approx. model with Weibull To check how well this pdf approxi-
mates Weibull distribution, we compare the pdf and hazard functions of approximate
and Weibull models (Figures 9). The hazard rate for the approximate model becomes
constant after some time. This can be understood by looking into the slope of the hazard
rate function for the approximate model :
σ(β − α)e−(σ+α+β)t
( σσ+α−β e
−βt + α−βσ+α−β e
−(α+σ)t)2
Note that the slope function is a non-negative decreasing function for β > α. Hence
after some time slope becomes zero.
(a) Pdf functions (b) Hazard functions
Fig. 9. Approximate vs. Weibull; X axis shows time in hrs
To understand the differences better, we look at the differences between the two
CDFs (Approximate minus Weibull). The difference is never more than +0.006 or less
than -0.003. Therefore, when using the CDFs to compute probabilities of any interval,
the results will never be erroneous by more than 0.006 - (-0.003) = 0.009, less than 1%.
The differences in the right tails apparently become zero, indicating the approximation
to be very good for right tail probabilities.
For TTOP and TTScr, with the same approach, we get complex number for σ and
β and negative value for α for each of the two solutions respectively. Hence, we use
other phase type distributions such as Erlang distributions [8]. We use a 3-stage Erlang
model. For TTScr λ = 0.019228232 and for TTR λ = 0.180345653. Using these models
for each type of failure/repair we build a detailed disk model (Fig.10).
Comparison of PRISM, Monte Carlo Simulation and DDF(t) equation Results: We
compare the reliability of RAID subsystems using PRISM model, Monte Carlo Simu-
Scalable Reliability Modelling of RAID Storage Subsystems 19
Fig. 10. Approx. Disk model based on Gopinath et al. [8]: one difference is that we consider here
a more accurate model that has a transition from Disk(LSE1) state to the Disk(LSE2) state with
rate σ rather than a transition from Disk(LSE1) to Disk(Burnt-in) state.
lation and DDF(t) equation (Table 7 and Table 8). We try to keep the variance of both
PRISM and Monte Carlo Simulation results same so that we can make a fair compari-
son. Hence, we set the termination epsilon parameter in case of PRISM and the number
of experiments parameter in case of Monte-Carlo simulation accordingly. Results from
Table 7 and 8 (under the column with 3-state disk failure model) show that DDF(t)
values calculated from PRISM model are similar with that of the MC-Sim and DDF(t)
equation. Due to the front-overloading of our approximate pdf (compared to the actual
Weibull pdf), the difference between DDF(t) values calculated using PRISM and the
other two methods (MC-Sim and DDF(t) equation) is much higher in the beginning.
Time(yr) pDDF3(t) pDDF4(t) sDDF(t) eqDDF(t) sDev3(%) sDev4(%) eDev3(%) eDev4(%)
1 7.12 5.59 5.63 5.64 26.5 -0.72 26.24 -0.9
2 14.37 12.2 12.23 12.26 17.5 -0.21 17.21 -0.46
3 21.67 19.26 19.21 19.31 12.8 0.28 12.22 -0.24
4 28.99 26.59 26.43 26.64 9.7 0.59 8.82 -0.20
5 36.35 34.06 33.8 34.21 7.5 0.75 6.26 -0.45
6 43.73 41.6 41.27 41.96 6 0.8 4.22 -0.86
7 51.13 49.17 48.79 49.87 4.8 0.77 2.53 -1.41
8 58.54 56.73 56.36 57.91 3.9 0.66 1.09 -2.09
9 65.96 64.27 63.93 66.08 3.2 0.57 -0.18 -2.73
10 73.39 71.78 71.50 74.35 2.7 0.38 -1.29 -3.46
Table 7. DDF(t) per 1000 RAID groups for 6 disk RAID5 : PRISM Model (PRISM DDF(t))
vs. Simulation (sDDF(t)) vs. DDF(t) equation (eqDDF(t)) result; pDDFi(t)= DDF calculated in
PRISM using i-state disk failure model. sDev = Deviation of PRISM results from Simulation
results; eDev = Deviation of PRISM results from DDF(t) equation results; Time taken for Model
Checking = 37 sec (using 3-state model) and 4.3 min (using 4-state model) while time for Simu-
lation = 8 min; both PRISM and simulation error are 1%;
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Time(yr) PRISM DDF(t) sDDF(t) sDev(%)
1 2.26 1.92 17.7
2 4.62 3.84 20.3
3 7.03 6.46 8.8
4 9.51 9.32 2
5 12.04 12.16 -1
6 14.63 14.87 -1.6
7 17.27 18.24 -5
8 19.96 21.52 -7.3
9 22.71 24.56 -7.5
10 25.50 28.16 -9.4
Table 8. DDF(t) per 1000000 RAID groups for 8 disk RAID6 with 3-state model: Time taken
for Model Checking = 12.6 min while time for Simulation = 26 hr; PRISM error is 1% and
Simulation Error is 4%
It can be noted that the higher deviation between the results of PRISM and simu-
lation due to front overloading of the approximate pdf can be reduced by adding more
states in the Markov model. We consider a 4-state model to check how well it approxi-
mates Weibull. Note that a 4-state Markov model has 5 model parameters. To estimate
them using moment matching will be a very hard problem. Hence we try to estimate the
parameters by trial and error method.
Next, we check how this 4-state model performs when modelling disk subsystems.
Table 7 (under the column 4-state disk model) shows the DDF(t) values computed using
the 4-state model and how it agree with simulation and DDF(t) equation results. Note
that in the time period of t = 0 to 10 yr, the deviations are now much less (especially in
the initial period), but the hazard rate function starts to flatten much earlier compared
to the 3-state model with moment matching. As we calculate mean for the whole sys-
tem, we use the 3-state model with parameters estimated using moment matching to
approximate Weibull model for modelling the whole system.
Apart from the results of Table 7 and 8, our Weibull approximation produces results
which are in reasonable agreement with Greenan’s simulation results [12] (details can
be found in Appendix C).
5.2 Whole system modelling with detailed model
Assuming the detailed disk model, we can model the large storage systems (Table 9)
using hierarchical decomposition. Table 9 shows the results using this detailed disk
model of Figure 10. The model results, however, still deviate from the field values,
although they are closer to the field data than the results with simple 3 state disk model.
Hence, we postulate correlated failure as a possible reason for the difference be-
tween model results and real system field results. Garth et al. [4] has found existence of
strong correlation in disk failures. The study by Jiang et al. [1] also show the existence
of correlated failure for disks. They show that RAID group spanned across multiple
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Configs. Model result(hr) Field value(hr)
(1, 1, t2, 24) 41396 35000
(1, 1, t1, 60) 18563 11000
(20, 20, t2, 480) 2070 1700
(20, 20, t1, 600) 2253 1200
Table 9. Weibull Model results vs. field value for the large storage configurations. Configs.
(a, b, c, d) a: number of controller-pairs, b: number of enclosures, c: type of an enclosure, d:
number of disks
enclosures exhibit lower correlated failure. The study also shows that the amount of
correlation depends on the particular enclosure model. We show that our correlated
failure model is consistent with these findings.
5.3 Modelling correlated failure for disks
The key point in modelling correlated failures for disks is that failure events are inde-
pendent of each other rather than individual disks failing independent of each other.
Each failure event may involve multiple disks. Let p be the probability that when a disk
fails another disk also fails simultaneously. The value of p depends on the source of
correlation (for example, the enclosure).
Fig.2 shows the CTMC model for a RAID5 group consisting of n disks in an enclo-
sure.
We use the “synchronized action” language construct in PRISM to build the model
in PRISM: such an action can be used to force two or more modules to make transitions
simultaneously with a rate that is product of two rates. For our models, we use one
action as the “active action” that actually defines the rate for the synchronized transition
and the other one as the passive action with rate as 1.
We model the storage configurations (Table 9) using the revised model and compare
them with field data.
Validation As we do not have any information on p for our systems, we assume a
particular disk failure model (i.e. 3-state model or Weibull model), estimate p for each
type of enclosure from the field data of 1 enclosure configurations and then use that
p to check whether the model results match field value for the multiple controller pair
configurations.
The model results are given in Table 6 under the column with the heading “with
correlated failure”; these agree with field data quite well.
Modelling the large storage configurations assuming Weibull model along with cor-
related failure for disks takes around 1.5 hr.
6 Conclusions
We have presented several approaches for reliability modelling of RAID storage sys-
tems starting from 4 to 600 disks. Using these models we are able to perform sensitivity
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analysis, make cost-reliability trade-offs and choose better reliability configurations. To
the best of our knowledge, there has been no comparable work in the open literature.
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A Other reliability measures
Generally, a RAID5 group consists of 6-8 disks because a larger number of disks in-
crease the chance of latent sector error during reorganization. Hence one RAID5 group
may not be sufficient to store large amounts of data. For systems with multiple RAID
groups accessed by multiple users we can define reliability metrics such as the follow-
ing:
Definition 3 [k%System MTTDIL+R(-R)] Mean time before which k% of “all” the
RAID groups experience “data inaccessibility or data loss” even with (without) repair.
With k=50, this is system “half-time” when repair is (is not) possible from the “data
inaccessible” state.
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In a multiple RAID system, the first measure (MTTDIL) is not sufficiently informa-
tive as a sysadm may be interested in knowing how many RAID groups are available for
allocation to different users when some RAID groups are undergoing repair (either con-
nectivity or rebuild). With the new measures, a sysadm will be able to select repair rates
and disk replacement rates to ensure satisfactory allocations of RAID groups (for ex-
ample, in a “cloud” setting). Consider also two users A and B where the disks for A are
in very highly unreliable enclosures while those for B are not. Although the MTTDIL
of the system is very low, B experiences good reliability (as the RAID groups used by
B experience high MTTDIL). The k%System MTTDIL-R metrics can reflect this in-
formation because it consider failures from “data inaccessible or data loss” state and
hence not much affected by a single weak link in the system. Therefore it can represent
the reliability of a system much better.
For example, for the systems of Figure 4 we claculate the 50% and 100% reliability
metrics as shown in the following table.
Configs. Reliability Measures By Simulation(hr)3 Time By Decomp.(hr) Err(%) States Time
single-pathing
MTTDIL 5940 2.7 hr 5972 0.54 13 137s
100%SMTTDIL-R 37027 8 min 35671 -3.6 2340 .31s
50%SMTTDIL-R 10155 24 min 9048 -11 150 .3
100%SMTTDIL+R 2146215 7.1 hr 2143599 0.12 2670 138s
50%SMTTDIL+R 13975 5 hr 14032 .4 150 137s
multi-pathing
MTTDIL 6968 3.6 hr 7015 0.7 148 137s
100%SMTTDIL-R 37168 10 min 36461 -2 33495 3s
50%SMTTDIL-R 14169 34 min 13171 -7 5072 0.4s
100%SMTTDIL+R 2578533 10 hr 2581352 0.1 33495 160s
50%SMTTDIL+R 593232 9.9 hr 597274 .7 5072 138s
Table 10. Results with Simulation and Hierarchical Decomposition for the systems of Fig 4); Err:
% diff betw the two results, SMTTDIL: System MTTDIL
From the table, it is clear that the metric 50%SMTTDIL+R expresses the advantage
of using multi-pathing which other metrics do not.Also, repair has a significant impact
on 50%SMTTDIL+R.
From the results of Table 10 With multi-pathing, we get 17% higher MTTDIL and
20% higher System MTTDIL+R (100%) compared to single-pathing at the cost of 14
SAS cables and 2 expanders. In this system, if we replace 6 disk RAID5 with 24 disk
RAID10 in each enclosure then with multi-pathing we get 7% higher MTTDIL and 2%
higher System MTTDIL+R (100%) at the cost of 50 SAS cables and 2 expanders. Such
calculations are important for cost-reliability trade-offs. In the first case multi-pathing
seems to be a good option while in the second case it is not. The reason is that, in the
latter case, the enclosure is less reliable (full enclosure MTTF = 11100 hr) and RAID10
is more reliable than RAID5.
For the 100%System MTTDIL+R and 50% System MTTDIL+R (in case of multi-
pathing), the contribution of subsystems (i.e. interconnect and disk subsystem) is very
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high; this can be verified by sensitivity analysis. Computationally, each of the subsys-
tems considered in isolation has a failure rate that is very close to constant failure rate;
we could not therefore reject the hypothesis that each of the subsystems has a constant
failure rate at even 20% level of significance in the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test. For other
reliability metrics, the contribution of subsystems (i.e. interconnect and disk subsystem)
is much less; the enclosure having an exponential failure distribution is the main con-
tributor; this has been verified by sensitivity analysis. Hence the results of hierarchical
decomposition and simulation is almost same for all the reliability measures we have
calculated.
B How to span a RAID group across enclosures ?
B.1 Without correlated failure
How should a storage system designer distribute the disks of a RAID group across
enclosures to get the maximum reliability? For a n disk RAID5 group, it is best to
distribute it across n enclosures (because no single enclosure failure causes data inac-
cessibility of the whole RAID5 group) but this may not be cost effective or possible.
Hence, one has to choose the best configuration among the sub-optimal solutions rather
than having the luxury of choosing the optimal solutions. Here we present a greedy al-
gorithm to find the optimum configuration for any f tolerant RAID group given n disks
and m enclosures (Algorithm 1).
Algorithm 1 Greedy algorithm for spanning
while n > 0 do
if n 6 mf then
Place f disks at a time in each of the empty enclosures until number of disks left (l) is
less than f . Place these l disks in the next enclosure.
break;
else
C ← highest available capacity amongst remaining enclosures
d← min(C, n)
Fill the chosen enclosure with d disks
n← n− d
m← m− 1
end if
end while
In Fig.11(a), we need to design a 14 disk RAID5 group using 2 enclosures where
the failure rate of an enclosure is as stated in Table 1. Using algorithm 1, the optimal
configuration is to put all the disks in one enclosure. We obtain MTTDIL = 11100
hr. Algorithm 1 assumes that all the enclosures have the same MTTF. However, an
enclosure is a shared component whose failure rate depends on the number of disks
present in it. If we span the disks across 2 enclosures such that each of them contains less
than or equal to 12 disks, we get MTTDIL = 14200 hr. In Fig.11(b), spanning a RAID
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(a) spanning increases reliability (b) spanning decreases reliability
Fig. 11. Enclosure failure rate∝ no. of disks inside it
group across 3 enclosures decreases reliability; here we used the PRISM simulator for
the computation.
B.2 with correlated failure
Spanning a RAID group across enclosures Suppose, a n disk RAID5 group is formed
inside an enclosure. Then the rate at which data loss occurs due to correlated failure is
nC2λp. Now, if the n disks are distributed across m enclosures (where m > 1 and, for
simplicity, n is a multiple ofmwith each enclosure containingn/m disks), then the rate
at which data loss occurs due to correlated failure is m[(n/m)C2]λp = (n((n/m)−1))λp2
that is less than nC2λp for m > 1. Hence with respect to “only” correlated failures,
spanning is a good option.
But, whether spanning will increase the chance of overall “data inaccessibility or
data loss” will depend on enclosure failure rate also (Fig.12). In Fig.12, for p = 0.4,
spanning is beneficial when enclosure MTTF is 60000 hr. but not useful if enclosure
MTTF is 28400 hr. Similarly, for a given enclosure MTTF, say 60000 hr, spanning is
beneficial when p = 0.4 but not useful when p = 0.2.
C Memorylessness assumption of Markov Model and our solution:
Kevin Greenan has raised several questions regarding suitability of Markov models as
a tool to measure storage reliability [12], as neither component wear-out nor rebuild
progress can be modelled using a system level Markov model due to its memoryless
property. The reason is that the notion of “absolute” time is present in a system level
Markov model whereas “relative time” for each component is needed and simulation is
the only solution.
We propose a solution for this problem by considering failure and repair modes of
each disk separately rather than considering a system level Markov model. Moreover,
when we approximate Weibull repair and Weibull failure by summation of exponentials
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Fig. 12. MTTDIL (hr) for a RAID group of 8 disks using correlated disk failure model. en: en-
closure
(i.e. by adding multiple states and transitions corresponding to a single failure/repair
transition) then these states keep information regarding repair progress and age of a
component respectively. Hence, our disk subsystem models using detailed disk models
reduce the chance of loss of information due to memorylessness property significantly.
To prove our claim, we modelled some disk subsystem configurations from Greenan’s
thesis [12] in PRISM and compared them with the Greenan’s simulation results (Fig.
13). We see that PRISM results are in reasonable agreement with his simulation results.
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(a) Simulation results [12]
(b) PRISM results
Fig. 13. Comparison of PRISM results with Greenan’s simulation results
